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KIDS WILL BE KIDS: TIME FOR A “REASONABLE 
CHILD” STANDARD FOR THE PROOF OF 
OBJECTIVE MENS REA ELEMENTS 
Christopher Northrop and Kristina Rothley Rozan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When a juvenile1 is charged with a criminal offense, it is the prosecutor’s and 
the defender’s goals to prove and disprove, respectively, the mens rea element of the 
alleged crime. The lowest level of criminal culpability—negligence—typically 
establishes the “reasonable person” as the reference point for the prosecutor and the 
defender to use as to whether the child is to be held criminally responsible.  For 
example, according to the Model Penal Code (hereinafter “MPC”), a person is 
negligent when his failure to perceive a particular substantial and unjustifiable risk 
“involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
observe in the actor's situation.”2 Some states’ criminal statutes not only make 
reference to a “reasonable person” standard in their definition of negligence, but also 
in their definition of recklessness, the next higher level on the spectrum of 
culpability.  For example, in Maine, a person is reckless when their conscious 
disregard of a risk involves “a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a 
reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation.”3 
Under tort law, a child accused of negligence receives special consideration 
unless certain exceptions apply.  According to the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a 
person negligently caused harm if they did not exercise “reasonable care under all 
circumstances.”4  For an adult defendant, in many cases it is sufficient for the fact-
finder to consider only the harm’s foreseeable likelihood and severity, and whether 
the defendant took precautions to eliminate or reduce its risk.5  However, in cases 
involving children, “the inquiry into reasonable care . . . requires attention to 
considerations or circumstances that supplement or somewhat subordinate the 
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 1. Our definition of juvenile is any person who has not attained the age of 18. 
 2. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. L. Inst. 2015). 
 3. 17-A M.R.S.A § 35(3)(c) (effective Sept. 20, 2007). 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (2010). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. d. (2010). 
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primary factors,”6 including the actor’s age, intelligence, and experience, unless the 
child was engaged in a dangerous activity “characteristically undertaken by adults.”7  
Further, children less than five years of age are categorically presumed to be 
incapable of negligence under tort law.8  
Criminal law statutes make no similar special accommodations for children 
accused of negligence offenses, nor do they specify which characteristics of the 
accused must or even may be attributed to the reasonable person against which 
evidence of an actor’s mental state is to be compared.9  The drafters of the MPC 
provided minimal guidance in characteristics that might not undermine the 
objectivity of the reasonable person standard, such as whether the accused was “blind 
or if he had just suffered a blow or experienced a heart attack.”10  But, they warn that 
“the heredity, intelligence or temperament of the actor would . . . depriv[e] the 
criterion of all its objectivity.”11  
Instead, it has been left to the courts to decide whether the reasonable person in 
a criminal statute takes on personal characteristics of the defendant,12 and the 
consequences for juvenile defendants have been decidedly mixed.  Some courts have 
viewed this opportunity for discretion, rather, as an inappropriate step into the 
prerogative of the legislature.  For example, in State v. Heinemann, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut upheld a trial court’s instruction that the defendant’s age could 
be used to differentiate him from those threatening him when considering a duress 
defense,13 but a requested instruction that his age was also a permissible factor to 
determine how he would have perceived the threat—regardless of the age of his 
alleged coercers—was rejected as it would “essentially would require this court to 
rewrite the entire Penal Code.”14   Conversely, the Court of Appeals of Alaska opined 
that holding juveniles to an adult standard of care for conversations that result in 
another person committing a crime would effectuate an inappropriate “broad and 
major change in the law” whereby juveniles would frequently be held to an adult 
standard of care.15 
Notwithstanding these recent inconsistencies in line drawing by individual 
courts,16 overall substantive criminal law continues to rely on adult standards of mens 
rea as the appropriate calibration of adolescent guilt.17 Without express guidance to 
do otherwise, fact-finders anchor their judgment of a juvenile’s culpability in their 
own adult decision making processes.18  The result is that we are finding children 
                                                                                                     
 6. Id. (emphasis added). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. § 3(c). 
 9. Michael Vitiello, Defining the Reasonable Person in the Criminal Law: Fighting the Lernaean 
Hydra, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2010). 
 10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (2015). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1436. 
 13. State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 295 (Conn. 2007). 
 14. Id. at 297. 
 15. J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
 16. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1437. 
 17. Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 590 
(2016) 
 18. Id. 
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criminally responsible for not behaving like reasonable adults.  This standard is 
highly inappropriate and perhaps even irrelevant.  Given what science tells us about 
the functioning of children’s brains19 and what the Supreme Court has said in several 
recent, high profile cases about juvenile culpability,20 it unfairly draws youth into 
the juvenile system. 
Inappropriate prosecution of children for any reason, including reliance on an 
improper reasonable person standard, is perilous to the individuals and to society.21  
First, juvenile system processing of any kind22 can have lifelong consequences.  In 
the short term, when we label certain acts as “deviant” and treat kids who commit 
them as “outsiders,” we may actually perpetuate the delinquent behavior.23  In the 
long term, records of juvenile adjudications can negatively affect educational, 
employment, housing, and military opportunities, and be used in adult criminal 
sentencing.24  Second, it perverts the criminal and juvenile law systems when we 
hold anyone criminally responsible and, subsequently, punish them in error.  
Delinquency is committed by almost every youth at some point in time25 and, after a 
period of occasional offending, most youth discontinue their delinquent behavior.26  
Third, the way we define criminal culpability has an enormous impacts.  In 2009 
there were over 1.5 million delinquency cases, and 33% of all these cases resulted in 
either adjudications of delinquency or transfers to adult criminal court.27  In some 
urban areas, there is an extreme prevalence of police and court involvement with 
youth.  A 2004 study in Denver found that 73% of males and 43% of females had 
been arrested by age 18.28  
Based on the goals of the juvenile system, significant advances in adolescent 
development research and recent Supreme Court holdings on juvenile culpability, 
we argue here that the juvenile code should be amended to explicitly refer to a 
reasonable child standard for any mens rea element that relies on a reasonable person 
as the measure for criminal culpability.  In Part II, we provide an overview of mens 
                                                                                                     
 19. See infra notes 27-69 and accompanying text 
 20. See infra notes 70-103 and accompanying text 
 21. See The Ctr. on Juv. and Crim. Just., Diversion Programs: An Overview, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9909-3/div.html (last visited March 19, 2016). 
 22. Juvenile justice processing may include arrest (police contact that resulted in referral to the 
prosecutor or court intake), police custody, detention, diversion, adjudication, deferred disposition, 
conditions of release, restitution, community service, court appearances, meetings with corrections 
officers, mandated counseling and program participation, probation, and confinement. See Statistical 
Briefing Book, Juvenile Justice System Structure and Process, 
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/case.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
 23. Diversion Programs: An Overview, supra note 21. 
 24. Julie Ellen McConnell, Five Devastating Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Delinquency 
Adjudications You Should Know Before You Represent a Child, 61 VA. LAW. 34, 34 (2012). 
 25. Data from Denver between 1987 and 1996 show that each year 47-70% of juveniles committed 
delinquent acts. David Huizinga et al., The Effect of Juvenile Justice System Processing on Subsequent 
Delinquent and Criminal Behavior: A Cross-National Study, at 49 (2004) 
(https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205001.pdf). 
 26. Id. at 48. 
 27. Of the 1,500,000 delinquency cases in the United States in 2004, 488,800 resulted in adjudications 
of delinquency and over 8,000 others were transferred to criminal courts. Charles Puzzanchera et al., 
Juvenile Court Statistics 2009, NATIONAL CENTER FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE at 7, 45, 48 (2012), 
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239114.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2016). 
 28. Huizinga et al., supra note 25, at 2. 
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rea, including why it is an element in crimes, how it is used and defined, what the 
courts have said about who the reasonable person is or can be, who the factfinders 
think the reasonable person is, and how reasonableness is proven or disproven.  We 
also briefly summarize recent scientific research about the juvenile brain and how 
can we use this information to construct a “reasonable child” standard.  In Part III, 
we discuss the Supreme Court’s holdings on juvenile culpability and argue why they 
should also apply to proof of the elements for the case in chief.  In Part IV, we explain 
why a reasonable child standard supports of the goals of the juvenile justice system.  
In Part V, we consider options as to how to change the reasonable person standard 
to a reasonable child standard.  In Part VI, we conclude that, from this point forward, 
a reasonable child standard should always be used as the reference for proof of 
objective mens rea elements for juveniles, and that legislative amendments to current 
criminal and juvenile statutes are the best way to achieve this. 
II.  MENS REA, THE REASONABLE PERSON, AND SCIENCE 
The purpose of the mens rea element in the definition of crimes is to support the 
legitimacy of the criminal law system.29  While there are an infinite number of ways 
in which people harm each other or jeopardize the health, safety, welfare, and morals 
of others, we have agreed as a society to generally only hold persons criminally 
responsible when they commit these acts with intent, knowledge, or some minimum 
level of carelessness.30  In other words, the mens rea element provides the factfinder 
with a mechanism to distinguish between when someone has simply stumbled over 
a dog and when they have kicked a dog.31  This concept may be relatively 
straightforward to appreciate but has proved more subtle and challenging in practice.  
A philosophical split has emerged.  One approach to mens rea is to define it in terms 
of the “evil,” “wanton,” or “malicious” state of mind of the perpetrator.32  Another 
approach, as adopted by the MPC, removes the moral judgment from the analysis 
and focuses instead on the intention of the accused.33  Rather than choosing one or 
the other, most jurisdictions have instead combined these approaches in unique ways 
such that it is now possible to identify twelve distinct mens rea terms used by the 
states and federally.34  Mens rea is a fluid concept that shifts with changing social 
norms and expectations.35 
Negligence, generally described as a significant deviation from an acceptable 
                                                                                                     
 29. Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the Criminal Law?, 
29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 21, 21-22 (2001). 
 30. There are also strict liability crimes, but they are discouraged. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 
600, 606 (1994); Model Penal Code §2.02. 
 31. We are alluding to the famous observation by Justice Holmes that “even a dog distinguishes the 
difference between being stumbled over and being kicked.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE 
COMMON LAW 3 (1881). 
 32. Miller, supra note 29, at 22. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 26.  Miller goes on to list twelve levels of mens rea: premeditation, willful, intentional, the 
requisite mental state to perform a felony dangerous to human life, the requisite mental state to perform a 
felony not dangerous to human life, intent to perform a criminal act clouded by loss of mental stability, 
knowledge, reckless, negligent, negligent based on relationship, strict liability, and absolute liability. Id. 
at 39-43. 
 35. Carroll, supra note 17, at 548. 
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standard,36 frequently is defined with a combination of subjective and objective 
elements.  The MPC only asks the factfinder to evaluate if it was the purely 
subjective, “conscious object” of the actor to cause a particular result in deciding 
whether they acted “purposefully.”37  But whether a person acted “negligently” 
depends both subjectively on whether “he should be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk” and whether his failure to perceive the risk involved an objective 
“gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe 
in the actor's situation.”38  Aside from some suggestions in the commentary,39 the 
drafters do not provide guidance on who this reasonable person should be. 
Adult and juvenile courts struggle with how to measure this reasonable person.  
Part of the difficulty in defining the reasonable person has been a lack of consensus 
on the purpose for our criminal justice system.40  Retribution is a dominant and 
ubiquitous justification for sanctioning dangerous behaviors that cause harm to 
others.41  When we convict a person based an objective reasonable person standard, 
we are punishing them for their failure to meet our expectations of caution.  Another 
prevalent justification for criminal justice is deterrence.42  In convicting an 
individual for behaving unreasonably, we seek both to impress upon him the 
desirability of a future, law-abiding existence, and to discourage all citizens from 
committing crimes.43  It is disputable whether the courts or the legislatures can craft 
a generic “reasonable person” standard that is attainable to both the individual 
standing before the court, and to all persons referring to this statute or precedent for 
guidance for their behavior.  Indeed, prominent scholars44 have argued that negligent 
behavior should be entirely excluded from criminal liability, in part because “the 
confusion of the ‘external’ standard of the ‘reasonable man’ employed in the method 
of proof with the standard of liability required by mens rea [has] given rise to 
decisions of very dubious validity.”45 
Rather than renouncing culpability for negligent acts entirely, courts have 
acknowledged the impropriety of applying a single, generic reasonable person 
standard to all defendants by allowing factfinders to incorporate limited variations 
of this reference point.  Courts start with an objective reasonable person standard, 
then allow introduction of evidence that may justify dangerous behaviors of a 
particular defendant.  For example, in the famous Goetz case, the court held it was 
proper that Mr. Goetz’s “reasonable belief” about his “situation” could include the 
physical attributes of the victims and defendant.46  This approach is not always 
successful.  In State v. Norman, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the 
                                                                                                     
 36. Miller, supra note 29, at 42. 
 37. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (2015) 
 38. Id. at § 2.02(2)(d) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. at § 2.02. 
 40. Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1437. 
 41. The ‘Lectric Law Library, Retribution, http://www.lectlaw.com/mjl/cl062.htm (2015). 
 42. Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal Deterrence, 100 J. Crim. 
L. & Criminology 765, 782 (2010). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See Vitiello, supra note 9, at 1438. 
 45. Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
632, 635 (1963). 
 46. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 52 (N.Y. 1986). 
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fact a woman suffered from battered woman syndrome was not relevant in 
determining the reasonableness of her belief in the necessity to kill her abusive 
husband.47  
Similarly, in some juvenile adjudications, the courts have explicitly wrestled 
with the “initial question [of] how this hypothetical reasonable person is to be 
defined.”48  After examining the laws of civil negligence in Arizona and around the 
country, the Court of Appeals of Arizona issued the narrow holding that it was the 
legislature's intention for the reasonable person reference to be juveniles of like age, 
intelligence, and experience for a fifteen-year-old charged with criminal recklessness 
for riding a shopping cart in a parking lot and cases closely analogous.49  However, 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut held the age of a defendant charged with robbery 
could only be considered a factor in evaluation of the objective component—did the 
defendant’s age, size and strength make him more vulnerable to physical threats—
of a duress defense.  The jury was not allowed to consider the subjective component 
– was the defendant’s moral temperament affected by his age.50  In In re A.A.M, the 
Court of Appeals of Minnesota found that there was no case law or statutory 
authority in Minnesota to support a reasonable juvenile standard for the element of 
consent in a criminal-sexual-conduct case.51  In State v. Marshall, the Court of 
Appeals of Washington presumed that because the Legislature established a 
rebuttable presumption that children 8 to 12 years of age were incapable of 
committing crimes, they intended for the “reasonable man in the same situation” 
standard for manslaughter to apply to juveniles over 12.52  However, “the juvenile 
status of a defendant is part of his situation and relevant to a determination of whether 
he acted reasonably.”53  In In re Welfare of S.W.T., the Supreme Court of Minnesota 
held that the culpable negligence of juveniles charged with aiding and abetting 
manslaughter must be decided with reference to the conduct and appreciation of risk 
reasonably to be expected from an ordinary and reasonably prudent juvenile of a 
similar age.54  In J.R. v. State, the Court of Appeals of Alaska determined that to 
sustain a charge of murder in the second degree, the question of whether a juvenile 
defendant displayed a reckless disregard for life must be judged by whether his 
conduct conformed to that of a reasonable juvenile.55  In State v. Oaks, the Court of 
Appeals of Arizona used an amendment to the state constitution about automatic 
transfer of juveniles charged with certain crimes to adult criminal court to dictate the 
use of an adult reasonable person standard at trial.  This amendment required any 
older juvenile accused of a violent crime to be “subject to the same laws as adults,” 
which the court held to mean that a fifteen-year-old charged with aggravated assault 
was properly measured against the standard of a reasonable person, and not that of a 
                                                                                                     
 47. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 14 (N.C. 1989). 
 48. In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). 
 49. Id.  
 50. State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 295 (Conn. 2007). 
 51. In re A.A.M., 684 N.W.2d 925, 928 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 52. State v. Marshall, 692 P.2d 855, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 53. Id. 
 54. In re Welfare of S.W.T., 277 N.W.2d 507, 514 (Minn. 1979). 
 55. J.R. v. State, 62 P.3d 114, 119 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003). 
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reasonable juvenile of similar age.56 
Regardless of any differences between adult and juvenile courts in the features 
of the accused that may or may not be ascribed to the reasonable person standard, or 
how reasonableness is proven or disproven, the methods in which the state proves 
the objective mens rea elements are similar.  In both adult and juvenile court, absent 
a person's outright admission regarding his state of mind, his mental state must 
necessarily be ascertained by inference from all relevant surrounding 
circumstances.57  Furthermore, there are no additional demands placed on the state 
to prove their case when the accused is a juvenile.  For example, in State v. Marshall, 
the Court of Appeals of Washington held that the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
15-year-old is an objective standard, “within the ken of the average fact finder, as is 
the standard of conduct of a reasonable adult,” and, therefore, that expert testimony 
was neither needed nor required.58 
The most fundamental requirements of our criminal statutes are that they clearly 
indicate when people have acted immorally, and that they are suitable and effective.59  
Two principal ethical arguments are offered as to why negligent acts are immoral.60  
The first states that negligent actors exhibit such an indifference to social values that 
they deserve punishment.61  The second, closer aligned with tort law, is that 
negligent actors have violated their moral duty not to harm social values.62  Despite 
long-standing, vigorous debate over the validity of negligence as a crime,63 the 
ubiquity of criminal negligence statutes indicates our society’s general agreement on 
the immorality of these acts.  “Suitable” means that the level of the state’s response 
to the act in terms of liberties taken and the intensiveness of rehabilitative efforts are 
appropriate.  “Effective” means that the statute has the desired individual and general 
deterrence.  
In the past, we have adjusted criminal statutes to satisfy these requirements 
based on shifting social norms and policy changes.  For example, the juvenile system 
was initiated at the beginning of the 19th century by social reformers seeking a more 
compassionate and rehabilitative path for delinquent youth who were being tried 
similarly to adults, and then were indiscriminately confined with hardened adult 
criminals and the mentally ill in large overcrowded and decrepit penal institutions.64  
In the late 1980s, based on the splashy promotion of the “super-predator” archetype, 
the public perception that juvenile crime was on the rise, and general fears that the 
system was too lenient, many states adjusted their criminal laws towards a more 
punitive goal, which included mandatory sentences and automatic adult court 
transfer for certain crimes.65 
                                                                                                     
 56. State v. Oaks, 104 P.3d 163, 167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004). 
 57. See In re William G., 963 P.2d 287, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997). 
 58. 692 P.2d 855, 857 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
 59. Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 
632, 636 (1963). 
 60. Id.at 637 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 637-38. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Ctr. for Crim. Juv. & Crim. Just., Juvenile Justice History, 
http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html. 
 65. Id. 
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Today, significant advances in brain research offer contemporary bases for the 
continued progression in the definition of criminal statutes.  Our understanding about 
the capacities and changes in the brain during adolescence can help us to re-craft 
laws and their application to be more justifiable, fair, and effective.  It has been a 
regular tradition of our criminal system to adjust our definitions and concepts of 
criminality to match shifting social norms and expectations, including concepts of 
mens rea.66 
With respect to need for statutes to define immoral acts, our society wishes to 
punish persons who are indifferent to social norms.  Unless an accused person 
confesses to such indifference, the fact-finder relies on circumstantial evidence a 
proof of indifference.67  Brain research shows that juveniles are not aware of social 
norms, and in fact engage in reward-seeking behaviors that may challenge social 
norms as a normative part of their development.68  Therefore, what appears as 
careless indifference based on the standard of a reasonable adult is a normal and 
essential part of the brain development of a reasonable juvenile.69  This does not 
mean kids should not be held responsible for harm that results from their negligence, 
but that it is inappropriate to criminalize this behavior as being immoral.  
Furthermore, according to the current language of the criminal statutes, negligence 
culpability attaches when there is a gross deviation from the standard of care of a 
reasonable person.70  Based on current science, it is normal and expected that 
children as a class will take significantly less care than adults.71  The options are, 
then, to eliminate negligence culpability for children entirely or else to only 
criminalize gross deviations from the standard of care that is to be expected for 
reasonable children. 
Considering negligence as the failure to satisfy a duty, brain research informs us 
about the duties we can justly assign to juveniles and about their ability to satisfy 
them.  Brain research supports both the time-honored tradition of tort law to assign 
duty as a function of age, and the age-basis on which we allow young persons to 
assume responsibilities like voting, drinking alcohol, and driving a car.  Simply by 
virtue of their age, juveniles are less aware of their duty to others.  They are also less 
able to assess the risk that their actions might violate their duty to others.72  
Therefore, a reasonable juvenile has less notice of her societal responsibilities and 
less capacity to satisfy them.  Thus, the brain research predicts that a substantial gap 
between kids’ behavior and the fulfillment of adult duties to society is completely 
normal. 
Suitable criminal statutes result in punishment that is proportional to the 
                                                                                                     
 66. Carroll, supra note 17, at 553. 
 67. Id. at 558. 
 68. Brief for Am. Psychological Ass’n et al. at 30 as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647) (citing Laurence Steinberg, A Behavioral 
Scientist Looks at the Science of Adolescent Brain Development, 72 BRAIN & COGNITION 160, 162 
(2010)). 
 69. Id. at 10 (citing Franklin Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender, in YOUTH ON 
TRIAL 271, 280 (Thomas Grisso & Robert Schwartz eds. 2000)). 
 70. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Am. L. Inst. 1985). 
 71. Brief of Am. Psychological Ass’n et al., supra note 68, at 7 (citing Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless 
Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 344 (1992)). 
 72. Id. at 10. 
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seriousness of an offence.  Brain research tells us that a juvenile’s deviation from an 
adult reasonable standard of behavior is not the indicator of a “criminal mind” in the 
same way that it might be for an adult.73  And so carelessly damaging a car in a 
parking lot with a shopping cart by an adult and by an child mean different things, 
and we are less justified in describing that behavior as evil when done by a child.  
Brain research can also help us to craft and apply statutes that have the desired 
individual and general deterrence.  Part of the role of the criminal statutes is to 
provide notice to society of immoral acts.  Indeed, the MPC’s drafters argue that 
negligence liability is an effective deterrent because it motivates people to “use their 
facilities and draw on their experience in gauging the potentialities of contemplated 
conduct,” such that they may take care before acting.74  A child is even less likely to 
have read the negligence statutes than an adult.  Another role of criminal statutes is 
to expressly record society’s well-known principles of right and wrong.  The MPC 
drafters further justify negligence culpability because they say it properly imputes a 
“moral defect” to people who act out of insensitivity to the interests of others.  But, 
brain research tells us that juveniles lack an adult’s capacity for mature judgment.75  
The reasonable juvenile has less direct experience and less indirect general 
knowledge.  And, insensitivity to others, although perhaps reprehensible, is a typical 
characteristic of children and not a moral defect. 
In summary, brain research has tipped the scales in favor of consistently 
adopting a reasonable child standard for all criminal statutes, and particularly for 
negligence-level crimes.  Whereas 10 years ago, based on the history of our legal 
and tort systems and our layman’s understanding about children, decent arguments 
could be made both ways.  But now, the research says that it is inconceivable that 
we should expect a child to behave like a reasonable adult.  What the reasonable 
adult would label as delinquency is actually normal and necessary behavior for kids.  
III.  SCOTUS SUPPORT FOR THE REASONABLE CHILD STANDARD 
Since 2005, the Supreme Court of the United States has issued a handful of 
opinions that have rocked the world of juvenile law.76  In these opinions, the Court 
combined the “commonsense reality”77 of age with the latest brain science research 
and what they termed as general characteristics of adolescents that “any parent 
knows,”78 to prescribe separate treatment for children who are suspected or 
convicted of crimes.  As summarized by the Court, children often lack the 
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be 
detrimental to them, they are more susceptible to outside influence, and their 
character is still evolving.79  The Court concluded, therefore, that children as a class 
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are less criminally culpable than adults and should be accorded different sentencing 
guidelines, even when convicted of the most heinous crimes.  When performing the 
custody analysis for Miranda rights during police interrogations, courts must now 
take into account all of the relevant circumstances of the interrogation, including the 
age of the suspect. 
In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held Miranda cases involving kids require 
special analysis because they are more likely than adults to make false confessions.80  
Indeed, the Court goes so far as to say that, in many cases, the evaluation of Miranda 
cases would be nonsensical absent the consideration of age,81 and to ignore age 
would be a cost to the juvenile’s constitutional rights.82  All suspects in custody must 
receive a reading of their Miranda rights before they are interrogated.  The inquiry 
as to whether the suspect was, in fact, in custody is purely objective with no 
consideration of the suspect’s actual mindset.  The first step in this inquiry is to 
describe the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.83  The second is to ask, 
given those circumstances, whether a reasonable person would have felt at liberty to 
terminate the interrogation and leave.84  The Court held that the suspect’s age impacts 
the way we must address both of these steps.85  Police are required to examine all 
circumstances, meaning any circumstance that would have affected how a reasonable 
person “in the subject’s position” would perceive their situation.86  A suspect’s 
identity as a minor, according to the Court, cannot be disentangled from these 
circumstances.87  Given that, as a class, children are less mature, less responsible, 
and more vulnerable or susceptible to pressure, the Court declared the reference 
against which to evaluate a suspect’s interpretation of their liberty is not a 
“reasonable person,” but a “reasonable child.”88 
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that the death penalty is unconstitutional, 
disproportionate punishment for juveniles.89  Relying, in part, on the latest scientific 
and sociological studies as confirmation of the traditional wisdom of parents, the 
Court summarized that we can objectively conclude that juveniles possess the 
qualities of immaturity, vulnerability, and a lack of true depravity.90  Therefore, 
“their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult,” even 
when having committed the most heinous crimes.91  They are more vulnerable or 
susceptible to negative influence, outside pressures, including peer pressure, and 
psychological damage.  And, their lack of maturity results in impetuous and ill-
considered actions and decisions, and lowers the likelihood of their taking any cost-
benefit analysis.  Hence, the death penalty is less likely to serve as a means of 
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deterrence than it would for adults.92 
In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that life without parole for juvenile non-
homicide offenders is a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.93  Age should be a factor in the analysis of the severity of 
sentencing, reasoned the Court, because it affects the severity of the punishment—a 
juvenile spending their life in prison will be committed for a larger proportion of 
their life than an adult94—and the rehabilitative potential of the offender (which is 
greater for children).  Life without parole for non-homicide juveniles also does not 
serve the legitimate penological goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation.95  
Referring to Roper, the Court noted that juvenile offenders categorically have 
diminished moral culpability.96  The Court also reviewed legislative enactments and 
actual sentencing practices in the United States and internationally to determine that 
there is a general consensus against the sentencing of non-homicide juveniles to life 
without parole.97 
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that mandatory life-without-parole 
sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional.98  A judge’s or jury’s lack of sentencing 
discretion based on the convicted juvenile’s youth and its attendant characteristics, 
along with the nature of his crime, would be, according to the Court, inconsistent 
with their “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change.”99  The Court 
reasoned that the categorical bans on certain punishments for being disproportionate 
when applied to juveniles announced in Roper and Graham, and the requirement that 
sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of 
his offense before sentencing him to death initiated in Woodson, lead to the 
conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the 
Eighth Amendment.100  Note that in Montgomery, the Court declared that Miller's 
prohibition on mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders announced a new 
substantive rule that, under the Constitution, must be retroactive.101 
While the holdings of these cases pertain only to the delivery of Miranda 
warnings and sentencing, the justification and reasoning which form their bases 
broadly apply to the characteristics of juveniles as a class that are unquestionably 
relevant to the state’s proof of its case in chief in a juvenile adjudication.  The most 
fundamental principle in our criminal justice system is that we only burden the 
liberties of those who are criminally culpable.102  Beginning with Roper and then 
again in Graham, J.D.B., and Miller, the Court repeatedly and forcibly proclaims 
that a juvenile’s irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an 
adult.  If a child’s culpability is lower even when having committed a heinous 
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crime,103 then it is unquestionably lower for negligence offenses, the least villainous 
crimes.  Given that the “reasonable person” is the standard by which we assess 
criminal negligence, the Court’s broad proclamations on reduced juvenile culpability 
prevail upon us to include childhood as a characteristic of the reasonable person 
reference.  
These Supreme Court holdings speak to the suitability of criminal negligence 
statutes as applied to children.  As is discussed and undertaken in Miller, it is 
appropriate to regularly review the match between culpability and potential 
penalties.  And as observed in Graham, the lower age of a juvenile defendant can 
exaggerate the liberties taken from someone convicted—or adjudicated—of a crime.  
Specifically, the records of a youth’s involvement with the juvenile justice system 
often remain available indefinitely, creating obstacles as they seek employment, 
education, housing, and other opportunities.104  It is doubtful that anyone would 
argue a child convicted or simply accused of criminal negligence is deserving of a 
lifetime stigma.  Furthermore, these obstacles can directly interfere with any 
rehabilitative services initiated by the judicial or executive branches of the 
government as they attempt to guide a negligent child back toward a more productive 
and law-abiding path.  In J.D.B., the Court notes that all American jurisdictions 
accept the idea that age is a relevant circumstance in negligence suits.105 
These Court opinions also enjoin us to carefully reconsider the effectiveness of 
criminal negligence statutes with respect to individual and general deterrence.  As 
indicated in Roper, children cannot and do not engage in the same cost-benefit 
analysis as adults.106  They are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influence 
and outside pressures, including peer pressure. Hence, they are much less likely to 
be dissuaded to act either because of the knowledge that an act is deemed illegal and 
unfavored by society, or because of the potential consequences of that act.  
While it might be raised that these Supreme Court holdings are highly applicable 
to the subjective intent or knowledge of an individual defendant, as they clearly are, 
the Court unequivocally states that “childhood” yields objective conclusions, 
independent of the mindset of any particular child.107  The Miller Court describes 
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences as 
“hallmark features” of juveniles.108  Referencing the reasonable person standard in 
Miranda cases in particular, even the state admits that some personal characteristics 
are relevant to an objective custody analysis, like blindness.109  And the Graham 
Court broadly declares that while a juvenile is not absolved of responsibility for his 
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actions, his transgressions are “not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”110  
The Court now recognizes that children, as a group, are less mature, more reckless, 
highly influenced by peers and, at times, incapable of removing themselves from 
horrific crimes.111  
IV.  THE “REASONABLE CHILD” AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Juvenile justice provides a system, separate and distinct from criminal justice, 
which encourages the treatment and rehabilitation of delinquent kids112 over 
punishment, and where they can avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction.113  
Prior to 1900, most child offenders over the age of seven were imprisoned with 
adults.114  However, with society’s shifting views on juvenile delinquency, political 
and social reformers around the turn of the 20th century began to create youth 
reformatories to house delinquent juveniles—along with some orphans and homeless 
children—away from adult convicts.115  States also created separate, less formal 
adjudication systems where youths were no longer tried as adult offenders, and 
judges could consider extenuating evidence outside of the legal facts surrounding the 
crime or delinquent behavior.116  
Later, Congress took corresponding steps in the furtherance of extending the 
guardian or "parens patriae" role of the state to encourage positive change in 
children engaged in criminal behavior.  The 1938 Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act 
provided juveniles with special protections such as the right not to be jailed unless it 
was necessary to secure their custody, safety, or community safety, and the right to 
be separated from adults.117  The Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act 
of 1968 conditioned federal funds on the states’ development of plans designed to 
address and curb juvenile delinquency in the community.  The 1974 Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention Act—most recently authorized in 2002—intended to 
encourage national standards for the administration of juvenile justice,118 added 
further protections including a requirement of "sight and sound separation" between 
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youth and adult offenders in detention centers,119 and a prohibition on placing youth 
who had committed status offenses120 in a juvenile or adult detention facility.121 
Despite these commendable accomplishments by the federal and state 
governments to take care of children at risk, it cannot be forgotten that the authority 
of the juvenile justice system comes from its power to enforce criminal statutes.  
Stated alternatively, the juvenile justice system may burden children’s liberties, even 
with the intent of benign intervention, only when they have broken the law.  The 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, applicable to the federal and state governments, 
respectively, provide that no person can be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.  In Gault, the Court held that juvenile adjudications, just 
like adult criminal trials, must “measure up to the essentials of due process.”122  It is 
a fundamental principle of due process that in order to prove its case, the government 
must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.123  While the 
juvenile justice system has adopted special features clustered around adjudication 
procedures and dispositional consequences, the standards for determining guilt in the 
criminal and juvenile systems are identical.124  As the Court held in Winship, the state 
must prove all elements of a criminal charge against a juvenile beyond a reasonable 
doubt.125 And the state’s efforts to supply such proof will result in a constitutional 
deprivation of interests if it is undertaken inappropriately. 
Based on the recent Supreme Court holdings in J.D.B., Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, due process in juvenile adjudications requires the state, when prosecuting a 
child for an act that constitutes a crime with the mens rea element based a reasonable 
person standard, to refer to a reasonable child.  First, it is virtually undisputed that 
the law should punish only culpable action.126  The Court in these cases said 
repeatedly and expressly that children are less culpable than adults.  And so, at the 
most basic level, it would be inconsistent with the Court’s holdings to compare 
children to reasonable adults to measure to measure their culpability.  To do 
otherwise would nullify the authority of the juvenile justice system. 
Second, the state typically relies on circumstantial evidence as proof of intent.127  
According to the Court and the scientific data on which it partly relied, children are 
more impetuous and susceptible to outside pressures.  Therefore, the acts of a child 
and any surrounding circumstances simply cannot be understood, nor may inferences 
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be drawn upon them in the same manner that we do for adults.  As held in In re 
William G., a fact-finder’s interpretation of the riding of a shopping cart in a parking 
lot must be different for children than for adults.128 
Third, an assertion that a person has the requisite intent to commit an offense 
suggests that the person has the capacity for consciousness, choice, and control,129 
and the Supreme Court has stated that children are presumptively different from 
adults in these capacities.130  With respect to consciousness, the Court held that kids 
possess only incomplete ability to understand the world around them.131  With 
respect to choice, the Court said that juveniles lack capacity to exercise mature 
judgment and has noted legal capacity laws, like smoking bans,132 that secure kids 
from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts.133  And regarding control, 
the Court declared that kids have less control, or experience with control, over their 
environment, and they lack the freedom to extract themselves from criminogenic 
circumstances.134  The reasonable person reference should reflect the age-appropriate 
capacity for consciousness, choice, and control of the accused. 
And fourth, due process assures that persons generally will not be held 
criminally responsible unless they had notice of the illegality of their actions.  First, 
except for a limited list of status crimes, no person can be charged without fair notice 
that his conduct is punishable.135 This notice requirement does not protect the acts of 
a person who can prove they had no knowledge of the criminal statute they are 
accused of violating.136  To the contrary, an awareness of social norms and 
expectations can sufficiently provide a person with what will and will not be 
acceptable behavior.  But a reasonable adult will not have the same social awareness 
as a reasonable child.  The Court in J.D.B. stated that children lack experience, 
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental 
to them,137 which again points to the need for the reasonable child reference.  
 The Due Process Clause also serves the goal of providing litigants a sense of 
procedural justice.138  Indeed, the Court has held that a fairness requirement is part 
of the Due Process Clause in juvenile adjudications.139  In addition to being 
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constitutionally mandated, this feeling of fair treatment is critical to the effectiveness 
of the juvenile justice system.  In Gault, the Court referred to scientific studies 
suggesting the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality, and 
orderliness may be more impressive and more therapeutic for juveniles than an 
informal court proceeding where a “fatherly judge” attempts to guide and help a child 
“by paternal advice and admonition.”140  Most children would instinctively sense the 
unfairness of being held to an adult standard of reasonableness. 
It could be argued that in moving from a reasonable adult standard to a 
reasonable child standard, kids will not be held responsible for their actions. But, 
kids will be found criminally responsible for their acts when their negligent behavior 
deviates from what would be expected from a reasonable person at their age.  And, 
there are other avenues for making kids pay for their misdeeds including the tort 
system and school discipline. 
The over-application of juvenile justice contact does not serve the goals of the 
system or of society.  Arrests and any resultant sanctions do not deter delinquent 
behavior and may instead exacerbate it.141  Adolescent delinquency has been shown 
to be unrelated to adult employment,142 but being sanctioned for such behavior, 
however, can be related to increased chances for unemployment.143 
Finally, despite the good intentions of the juvenile justice system, the collateral 
consequences of a juvenile adjudication could outweigh any benefits of the state’s 
benevolent interposition of its power.  The services kids would receive as part of 
their disposition and other appropriate sources of support would still be available.  
And, kids who are adjudicated have difficulty obtaining employment, serving in the 
military, or obtaining financial aid for college.144 These burdens are at odds with the 
goals of rehabilitation and the realization of a law-abiding adult life.  
V.  EXPRESS STATUTORY ADOPTION OF THE REASONABLE CHILD  
STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE 
The Supreme Court’s recognition of the science establishing an adolescent’s 
diminished culpability and transitory nature leaves two approaches to consider145 
when a system attempts to incorporate this jurisprudence into the adjudication 
process of children accused of negligence offenses.  The first is to use the holdings 
as grounds to argue over the subjective ability of the accused juvenile to meet the 
reasonable person standard as it is currently described and understood (the 
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reasonable adult).146  The second is to revise the objective standard itself.147  Here, 
we argue for the latter. In specific, we suggest that state statutes—and the language 
of the MPC—defining a “reasonable person” as the reference point for criminal 
negligence for juveniles must be updated to expressly refer to a “reasonable child.” 
Our rationale is, in summary, that this change is necessary to achieve compliance 
between juvenile justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the goals of the 
juvenile system, the constitutional basis upon which the juvenile system is 
authorized, and society’s understanding of adolescence and culpability.  Statutory 
recognition validates the discretion of law enforcement officers, corrections officers, 
DAs, and judges to divert kids participating in low-level delinquency to receive 
support and make restitution for any harm they may have caused in a manner that 
does not disrupt what will most probably be their natural maturation toward crime-
free adult behavior.148  A reasonable child standard properly empowers defense 
attorneys to argue that their clients’ acts do not reach the level of culpability 
sufficient to trigger intervention by the state.  A statutory change undertaken by the 
legislatures dispenses with the aversion of the courts to make a policy-oriented 
change on their own in response to the Supreme Court’s holdings, but without the 
endorsement of elected representatives. And, absent stronger sealing or 
expungement options, this shift to the reasonable child standard is the most effective 
way to shield children from unfair, counterproductive lifelong collateral 
consequences. We now address each one of these reasons in more detail. 
With the Court’s forcible reiteration in Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller of the 
reduced culpability of children, it is arguably inconceivable that participants in 
juvenile adjudications would continue to compare children’s behavior with that of a 
reasonable adult at any stage in juvenile court proceedings.149  This conclusion is 
especially compelling when the Court in J.D.B. has explicitly declared the 
requirement for a reasonable child standard in Miranda cases.150  While the holdings 
in these cases pertain to sentencing and the custody test in the Miranda analysis, the 
Court does not set any limitations on the points along the course of a juvenile 
proceeding at which the science to which it referred is relevant.  It is hardly far-
fetched to apply the Court’s beliefs on children’s culpability to the proof or disproof 
of the mens rea element of an alleged crime which is precisely at the point where we 
assign or reject culpability, when diminished culpability is now the Court’s operative 
jurisprudential theory.151  But, while the neuroscience about the development of 
juvenile’s brains is undeniably based on data collected about individual children, the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in these four self-referential cases are about children as a 
class.  The Court repeatedly and forcefully made statements, demonstrating its belief 
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in the relevance of neuroscience to general propositions as to the normal 
developmental course of adolescence.152  Therefore, these cases do not obviously 
stand for the proposition that their holdings or the neuroscience is mandatory, or even 
generally applicable for the subjective ability of individual kids, in juvenile 
adjudications.  In addition, the neuroscientific techniques may not be reliable enough 
to make individual evaluations of culpability.153  Such evaluations may also be 
impractical or inconsistently available due to cost and time considerations.  This is 
not to say that it is improper to make these subjective arguments, nor is it a prediction 
that the science will not advance to a point such that this approach becomes more 
suitable.  While some may still cling to a narrow reading of the Court’s holdings as 
only pertaining to Miranda custody analysis and sentencing, it would be 
inharmonious with the Court’s clear support for reduced culpability to judge a 
juvenile as culpable based on his inability to conform with adult expectations, but 
then to later deem the adolescent offender inculpable as an adult for purposes of 
punishment,154 and this “effort at containment” of the reduced culpability doctrine is 
likely to weaken over time.155  Such a limited use of the science fails to address the 
underlying dilemma that the assessment of culpability was flawed in the first 
place.156  Even scholars who argue for cautious use of the science acknowledge that, 
in Graham, the Court made clear that the general developmental principles 
underlying Roper are relevant to any aspect of doctrine relying on assumptions about 
youths' attributes and capacities,157 and that group-level assessment as to juveniles' 
relative immaturity is, indeed, relevant to the construction of mens rea statutes that 
incorporate external norms, such as negligence and recklessness.158  It may be argued 
that, by incorporating features of the accused into the character of the reasonable 
person, we will inappropriately convert a metric that is intended to function 
objectively into a subjective one.  But the consideration of age in juvenile 
adjudications is analogous to in tort cases, where “[a]ll American jurisdictions accept 
the idea that a person's childhood is a relevant circumstance” where liability turns on 
what an objectively reasonable person would do in the circumstances.159  To the 
contrary, to ignore age could make the objective inquiry of reasonableness more 
artificial.160  The Court in J.D.B. held “that courts can account for that reality without 
doing any damage to the objective nature of the [Miranda] custody analysis.”161 
Additionally, factfinders have a wide basis of community experience upon which it 
is possible, as a practical matter, to determine what is to be expected of children.162  
It may also be suggested that courts should wait for the Court to explicitly rule on 
how the brain science should change how we approach mens rea in a juvenile case.  
But, even before Roper, some states relied in part on the developmental neuroscience 
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to eliminate the juvenile death penalty,163 and criminal negligence is a considerably 
less heinous offense. 
Next, the juvenile justice system is founded on the well-appreciated differences 
between children and adults, and on society’s support for treating children differently 
as a group.  It is, therefore, congruous with the traditions of this system to set a 
separate bar of reasonableness for children as a class.  There are rare instances, 
particularly for violent crimes, where our society wishes children to be appraised as 
adults.  These children are removed from the juvenile system and subsequently 
“bound over” to the adult criminal justice system so that they can be evaluated 
according to adult standards of culpability.  The plain implication of this approach is 
that the standards to which children are held accountable in the juvenile system are 
different than those for adults, and it is only under extraordinary circumstances that 
we choose to evaluate their behavior as adults.  Further, the primary goal and purpose 
of the juvenile system is to promote rehabilitation.  Children passing through a 
normal stage of adolescence164 are not in need of rehabilitation.  It would be an 
anathema to that system to label as “criminal” what is, in fact, a transitory and a 
necessary component of eventual development into adulthood that allows individuals 
to understand socially created boundaries and to live within them.165  Some may 
worry that raising the bar for the criminal culpability of kids will allow them to get 
away with delinquency, reduce their motivation to conform to societal norms, or 
make society less safe.  But, we do not suggest that biological or neurological 
realities exclusively control behavior.166  There are obviously times where people, at 
any age, grossly deviate from reasonable behavior such that state intervention is 
authorized, and the state should have a full opportunity to prove that is the case.  The 
ultimate goal in formally adopting a reasonable child standard is not to absolve kids’ 
responsibility for actions, but to be more accurate as to what we label as criminal 
behavior.  Finding children criminally negligent when they lack the capacity to 
understand the risk that they are taking, is punishing them for their incapacities, not 
their bad minds.167  Even if a child’s behavior does not rise to the level of criminal 
negligence, there are still other ways to have them make restitution for any harm they 
may have caused.  And, interactions with the juvenile system may perpetuate 
delinquent behavior.168  Critics of a reasonable juvenile standard could say that there 
are already points in the juvenile justice process where a child’s age can be properly 
accommodated such as the decision to arrest a child in the first place, whether to file 
a petition, or whether to divert a case. The constitutional due process rights of 
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children should not be left to the discretion of state agents. Other critics may argue 
that the setting of 18—or any age—as the cut-off between adolescence and adulthood 
is arbitrary, or alternatively that kids nearing 18 look enough like adults to be 
expected to behave as such.  But, the employment of 18 as demarcation is entirely 
consistent with many other areas in law (like minimum voting age), and the brain 
research shows that immature decision-making capacity lasts well beyond the age of 
18.169  
The recent diminished culpability jurisprudence of the Court gives rise to 
another potential constitutional issue.  If jurisdictions continue to employ an adult 
standard of reasonableness to measure children’s mens rea, it could give rise to an 
argument that the use of this antiquated standard is a violation of a juvenile’s due 
process, and lead to sentences challenged as cruel and unusual punishment contrary 
to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.170  The Court in McKeiver—citing 
Winship and Gault—recognized that the constitutional standard for due process in 
juvenile proceedings is fundamental fairness.171  Fundamental fairness cannot be 
satisfied by gauging children’s behavior according to the adult world where the norm 
is compliance.172  Children as a class do not have the awareness of adult levels of 
care nor are they equipped to achieve them.  This does not preclude a defense 
attorney from presenting evidence using neuroscientific methods to argue that an 
individual child did not have the capacity to achieve a reasonable standard of care, 
or a DA to refute such evidence.  Regardless of any subjective evidence that may be 
discussed, the objective standard to which they refer, moving forward, should be that 
of a reasonable child and to do otherwise would extend the state’s authority beyond 
the boundaries set by the constitution.  “[T]he negligence standard is constitutionally 
permissible because it approximates what the due process guarantee aims at: an 
assurance that criminal penalties will be imposed only when the conduct at issue is 
something society can reasonably expect to deter,”173 and the “same characteristics 
that render juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”174  But again, given that the Court’s opinions are more 
strongly grounded in observations about children as a group, the constitutional 
necessity of evaluating a child’s subjective capacity for negligence is less sustained. 
Next, the shift to a reasonable child standard for criminal negligence is 
fundamental to society’s continuing commitment to treat children differently and to 
society’s expectation for the role of mens rea elements in the definitions of crimes.  
Even the dissent in Graham acknowledges that “[o]ur society tends to treat the 
average juvenile as less culpable than the average adult.”175  The deep systemic 
changes enacted in the juvenile justice system in the 1990s in response to fears of 
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juvenile “superpredators” remain largely in place.  “In important respects, the 
juvenile system became indistinguishable from the adult one, and the benefits it 
retained became available to fewer young persons.”176  An explicit reference to a 
reasonable child in the criminal negligence statutes would be a step toward regaining 
some of the ground lost for kids.  This reference is also needed to repair the role of 
mens rea.  Reliance on an adult mens rea standard for youthful offenders, in the face 
of overwhelming scientific evidence supporting the unjustness of this comparison, 
undermines mens rea’s value.177  Many states recognize incompetency as a safety 
net for a child’s behavior that, though damaging, is not blameworthy.178  To ignore 
the legal gap between a competency determination and a child’s inability to reach a 
reasonable adult standard to form criminal intent is to choose ease of prosecution 
over fundament fairness.  Some citizens may feel they are safer by “broadening the 
net” of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over delinquent behaviors.  As discussed 
above, interactions with the juvenile system fuel delinquency and disrupt what would 
otherwise be the natural maturation into crime-free adult behavior.  “Adults bear a 
special responsibility to provide youth with adequate opportunities to reach their 
potential, no matter what they have done.”179  We are not suggesting that we raise 
the bar of culpability for the worst offences but instead for the least serious.  Society 
and the courts have long endorsed the doctrine that criminal negligence liability 
should be harder to prove than tort negligence.180  If the criminal system does not 
endorse a reasonable child standard analogous to that in torts, then the converse 
situation could result.  Some citizens may worry that the retribution role of the 
juvenile courts, even if it is secondary to rehabilitation, will be diluted if it becomes 
harder to adjudicate kids.  This retribution is not being applied fairly.  In 2009, the 
delinquency case rate for males was 2.5 times greater than the rate for females.181  
While white youth made up 78% of the U.S. population under juvenile court 
jurisdiction,182 the total delinquency case rate for black juveniles (103.2) was more 
than double the rate for white juveniles (40.3).183  Black youths are more likely to be 
detained, especially for drug offense cases.184 
With a reasonable child standard, kids accused of negligence crimes would no 
longer have to rely on the common sense of law enforcement personnel, corrections 
officers, DAs, and judges about the normalcy of delinquent behavior.  Right now, 
the decision not to charge or ultimately adjudicate a child accused of a negligence 
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crime based on the intuition that this is “just a kid being a kid” depends on the 
benevolent compassion of the decision-makers in the juvenile decision. There are 
several points along the course of a juvenile proceeding where the concept of a 
reasonable child should and, to some extent, perhaps already does inform and 
influence the outcome.  But, decision-makers typically will have only partial 
information at early, pretrial stages about either the child or the circumstances of his 
offense.185  Considering these four recent cases and their use of neuroscience as a 
reinforcement of the Court’s commitment to the special legal status of youth,186 it is 
time to give express legal stature to the decision process of people who determine 
the fate of kids in the juvenile system.  This does not mean that kids will not be held 
responsible for harms they may have caused.  They are still subject to school 
discipline systems and the civil courts.  They can still interact with victims advocates 
and the restorative justice system as a means to resolve any outstanding issues.  The 
opportunity still remains for kids in need of support to be referred to the appropriate 
providers and agencies.  Criminal negligence may still be found even when a child 
acts with a sincere good faith belief that his actions pose no risk, as long as the 
factfinder determines that his belief was unreasonable for an ordinary and reasonably 
prudent child of similar age.187  Some may argue that diversion provides the properly 
balance between state intervention and informality.  But, any interaction with the 
juvenile justice system generates records that can result in collateral consequences.  
And, diversion programs can aggravate rather than deter recidivism, and raise levels 
of perceived labeling and self-reported delinquency among youth.188 
A statutory change to the reasonable person reference would give the legislative 
blessing to formally apply the reasonable child standard that some state courts have 
already begun to entertain.189  This change would have the additional benefit of 
creating a more consistent treatment of the defendant’s age within a single 
proceeding.  For example, a court would not refer to an objective reasonable child 
standard in the Miranda analysis, and then the reasonable adult standard in the trial.  
In State v. Heinemann, the court may not have issued the awkward holding that a 
defendant’s age could be used to differentiate him from those threatening him when 
considering a duress defense,190 but could not use age as a factor to determine how 
he would have perceived any threats regardless of the age of his alleged coercers.  It 
is also possible to wait for the courts to interpret the ramifications on their own, and 
the Graham Court created more “breathing room” for the lower courts to do so.191  
However, there would be many children unfairly assessed in the meantime, and some 
courts might still resist applying adolescent brain science given how deeply the 
existing doctrinal forces are entrenched.192  Many states still have significant punitive 
components in their juvenile delinquency codes.  This trend to treat children charged 
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with crimes more like adults grew rapidly in the 1990s due to a spike in gun violence.  
Unfortunately, most of these laws are still on the books.193  We could face a similar 
situation, just as when some courts were wrestling with the “troubling questions” of 
juvenile life without parole.194  There would also be inconsistent treatment of kids195 
in a manner incongruent with the Supreme Court’s reduced culpability doctrine that 
might be very difficult to appeal. 
The reasonable child standard will empower defense attorneys to provide the 
best and most appropriate advocacy for their clients.  When appropriate, defense 
counsel could present evidence to describe the reasonable child and how they would 
act in the circumstances.  But, factfinders need no training in science to account for 
a child’s age, and may instead rely on a “wide basis of community experience upon 
which it is possible to . . . determine what is to be expected of children.”196  Critics 
of this standard change might suggest the more correct statutory response to the brain 
science would be to add a new means to challenge the state’s ability to prove the 
mens rea element of the crime of which a child is accused.  For example, the Maine 
criminal statutes provide that the defense may introduce evidence of an abnormal 
condition of the mind to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a required 
culpable state of mind.197  But, the brain science does not defensibly support 
individual evaluations of mental state at this time,198  and so challenges of individual 
variation may hinder its relevance and impact.199  Adolescence is not something that 
needs to be proved, nor is infancy a defense.  The juvenile justice system is not the 
place to handle normal childhood delinquency.  The admission of testimony 
regarding adolescent development should not depend on a legislative 
modification,200 other than formal adjustment of the proper negligence reference 
point.   
Another problem with a case-by-case approach is that it does not take into account 
of special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile representation . . . [where] 
[j]uveniles mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal justice 
system and the roles of the institutional actors within it, . . . [and] are less likely than 
adults to work effectively with their lawyers to aid in their defense.201 
The statutory adoption of a reasonable juvenile negligence standard puts what 
is, indeed, a policy change properly into the hands of the legislature, and the 
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adolescent brain research offers an appropriate basis for legal decisionmakers 
performing a policymaking function such as this to treat youth as a group in a 
particular way.202  In some instances, the adoption of the Court’s doctrine is the role 
of the lower courts, and some may suggest that the line-drawing between relevant 
and irrelevant subjective characteristics that may be ascribed to a reasonable person 
best is left to those institutions,203 or in the extreme that resolving in the abstract all 
of the possible personal traits may be ascribed to the reasonable person may be too 
daunting for any legislative reform.204  Adjudication has advantages over the 
legislative process because the courts’ “duty to do justice,” coupled with the public 
nature of decisions made on the record, affords a level of transparency not available 
in the legislative process.205  Unfortunately, the courts’ treatment of reduced juvenile 
culpability has been inconsistent, and without uniform guidance from courts, “we 
cannot hope for a uniform, predetermined solution” to the identity of the reasonable 
juvenile.206  Despite frequent arguments on behalf of juvenile defendants, courts have 
been reluctant to rely on neuroscience outside of sentencing mitigation.207  There is 
also an economic factor that favors legislation; the need to continually litigate 
adolescent development issues for individual cases will have a significant resource 
cost—time and money—for defenders, prosecutors and courts.208 Additionally, 
legislatures are unquestionably in the best position to reverse the sweeping policy 
changes of the last two decades.209  Laws enacted by the state legislatures around the 
country is the most reliable objective signal of contemporary values.210  Without a 
categorical rule, juveniles run the risk that the particulars of their case will overpower 
“youth” as a matter of course,211 as it did pre-Roper, “even where the juvenile 
offender's objective immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should 
require a sentence less severe than death.”212 
Finally, with the significant collateral consequences of interaction with the 
juvenile system,213 it is fair and legitimate to formally change the objective standard 
behavior to that of a reasonable juvenile.  Even juvenile charges can have devastating 
“ripple effects” on a child’s access to education, housing, and military careers, and 
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can influence the outcome of future proceedings,214 particularly for black males.215  
Weak or non-existent sealing or expungement laws, bolstered by the eternal memory 
of the Internet, mean that interactions with the juvenile system may never go away.216  
More fundamentally, over-adjudication has the potential to derail the otherwise 
natural progression of a delinquent youth into a law-abiding adult. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In a line of recent cases that have rocked the world of juvenile law, the Supreme 
Court relied on both the latest adolescent development research and the timeless 
knowledge of parents to forcefully and repeatedly state that children are more 
impetuous, more vulnerable to outside pressures, less depraved, and less culpable for 
their actions than adults.217  Despite this stance, criminal negligence statutes 
continue to refer to the “reasonable person” standard, which does not take into 
account the age of the accused, as the benchmark for guilt or innocence.  In doing 
so, we hold children to, at the very least, an irrelevant and arguably unfairly 
demanding behavioral ideal by criminalizing normative adolescent behavior.  This 
result is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s holdings that require special treatment 
for juveniles in the custody analysis for Miranda cases and during sentencing.  
Delinquency is a normal stage of adolescent behavior, particularly for boys, from 
which the vast majority age out.218  Furthermore, records of juvenile adjudications 
can have lifelong, negative collateral consequences on children’s educational, 
employment, housing, and military opportunities and, as such, subvert the 
rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile system.  
In this article, we argue that states' juvenile codes and the MPC should be 
amended to explicitly refer to a reasonable child standard for any mens rea element 
that relies on a reasonable person as the measure for criminal culpability.  This 
statutory change is necessary to achieve uniformity between the functioning of the 
juvenile justice system and the Supreme Court’s modern doctrine of reduced juvenile 
culpability.  The change is needed to reestablish the constitutional authority of the 
system, to explicitly validate the discretion that law enforcement officers, corrections 
officers, DAs, and judges already employ to accommodate age, and to avert the 
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potentially devastating collateral consequences that any juvenile record may yield. 
As the Supreme Court has vigorously recognized, “[a] child's age is far ‘more 
than a chronological fact.’”219  It is time for a new approach to mens rea analysis for 
juveniles that is consistent with what we know from our experience, with the latest 
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